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1.  INTRODUCTION 
More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith (1776) showed skepticism about the 
efficiency of joint stock companies because of the separation of management from 
ownership. He observed that managers of joint stock companies cannot be expected to 
watch over the business with the same anxious vigilance as owners in a partnership 
would. Adam Smith’s worry remained buried for a century and a half until Berle and 
Means (1932) rekindled interest in this area when they hypothesised in their book that 
dispersed shareholding is an inefficient form of ownership structure. They argued that 
separation of ownership and management control has changed the role of owner from 
being active to the passive agent. Dispersed shareholders lack incentives to monitor self-
interested managers who possess only a small fraction of the total shareholdings. The 
propositions by Adam Smith (1776) and Berle and Means (1932) received some support 
when Jensen and Meckling (1976) tied together the elements of property rights, agency 
costs, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure of a firm.  Jensen and 
Meckling asserted that agency costs are real, which the owner can reduce either by 
increasing ownership stake of the agent in the firm or by incurring monitoring and 
bonding costs. In early tests, several research studies supported the views of Jensen and 
Meckling. However, these studies did not account for endogeneity problem. 
A significant turn in the direction of research in this area was observed when 
Demsetz (1983) questioned the views held by Berle and Means (1932). Demsetz 
proposed that the ownership structure of the firm is optimally determined based on the 
principle of profit maximisation. Owners of a closely held firm will sell shares only when 
they expect that doing so will increase the firm’s performance. Similarly, owners of a 
widely held corporation will sell their shares in a takeover situation when they expect that 
doing so is optimal. Existing and potential shareholders choose concentrated or diffused 
ownership structure for a firm so that optimal performance level is reached. This implies 
that there is no systematic relationship between the level of ownership concentration in a 
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firm and the firm performance. Allowing for endogenous determination of ownership 
structure and firm value, several studies including Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) show support for Demstez (2003)’s argument.  
The nature of interaction between different stakeholders, and hence its implication 
for firm value, is different in developing economies. Claessens, Djankov, Fan, Lang, and 
Fomento (1999) maintain that many of the East Asian economies are characterised by 
weak property and investors’ rights, poor judicial efficiency, and corruption. These 
features make it easier for influential parties to exploit weaker ones. Moreover, many 
developing countries including Pakistan have family- and group-controlled businesses 
where substantial portion of shareholdings lie with family members or associated 
companies. Large shareholders such as these have significant powers to redistribute 
wealth in ways that might not coincide with the interests of other stakeholders [Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997)]. A special case of a country where judicial efficiency is low [World 
Bank (2010)], property and investors’ rights are weak, and family- and group-controlled 
businesses are ubiquitous is Pakistan. Despite these facts, this country has not been able 
to attract sufficient attention of empirical researchers in this area. The main objective of 
this study is to fill this gap. Specifically, this study tests hypotheses and predictions of 
various theories which were discussed in the preceding paragraphs in the context of 
Pakistan. In doing so, it accounts for the problem of endogeneity by estimating two-stage 
least square (2SLS) regression and models the relationship between various ownership 
variables in a manner that is consistent with the suggestions of Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001). Moreover, it uses several alternative proxies for external monitoring to check 
robustness of the results. The rest of the paper is organised in the following manner. 
Section 2 briefly reviews the existing literature and testable hypothesis are drawn in light 
of existing literature. Data, methodology and model specification are discussed in Section 
3. Section 4 highlights the descriptive statistics and discusses the regression results. 
Finally in Section 5 some concluding remarks are presented. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RELATED LITERATURE 
This section reviews the theoretical considerations surrounding a firm’s ownership 
structure and the firm’s performance. Empirical evidence in favour or against these 
theoretical underpinnings are also presented. Finally, testable hypotheses are developed 
towards the end of this section.  
 
2.1.  Ownership Patterns and Firm’s Performance 
More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith observed that managers of a joint stock 
company cannot be expected to work with the same devotion as the owner of the business 
would. Berle and Means (1932) extended Smith’s rationale and argued that firms with 
dispersed ownership will suffer more from agency problems. Diffused ownership gives 
significant power to managers under which they could use the firm’s resources for their 
personal gains, instead of maximising the shareholders’ wealth. Berle and Means recipe 
for better corporate performance is a concentrated ownership structure. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) developed a more comprehensive framework to suggest that 
concentrated ownership benefits a firm in a sense that large shareholders can reduce the 
firm’s transaction costs by negotiating and enforcing contracts with different 
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stakeholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) reach the same conclusion as Berleand Means, 
and Jensen and Meckling, but with a different explanation. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
suggest that large shareholders have the ability and incentives to monitor managers, 
which implies that the presence of large shareholders improves the firm’s value. The 
consensus developed over the passage of time from the perspective of agency theory, 
imperfections in the labour, capital, and product markets was that the ownership structure 
does matter in the valuation of a firm. However, Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) challenged this view when they hypothesised 
that ownership structure and firm value are determined endogenously. Their central 
hypothesis was that existing and potential shareholders change ownership structure of the 
firm in view of the profit-maximisation motives. In other words, ownership structure is as 
likely to be influenced by the firm performance as it may influence firm performance. As 
a result, there should be no systematic relationship between the two. Limited empirical 
evidence exists in support of the views of Demsetz (2003) as observed by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997, p.759),  
“Although Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that there should 
be no relationship between ownership structure of a firm and its performance, the 
evidence has not borne out their view.” 
Thus, there exists some sort of agreement among financial economists that large 
shareholders create value, however, the relationship may not be infinitely linear. For 
example, when large shareholders possess a larger fraction of shareholdings, this may 
enable them to indulge in expropriating minority shareholders and other stakeholders 
such as bondholders [Shleifer and Vishny (1997)]. This aspect of ownership structure and 
its implications for firm performance are reviewed next. 
 
2.2.  Large Shareholders and Firm Performance 
Large shareholders bring a unique set of benefits and costs to a firm. As outlined 
in Subsection 2.1, large shareholders are good at monitoring and reducing transaction 
costs in a sense that they make and enforce better contracts with stakeholders of the firm. 
However, at the same time, large shareholders have costs as well. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) discuss several costs of large shareholders which may in turn destroy value for 
other stakeholders of the firm. First, if large shareholders have relatively more control 
rights than their cash flow rights, they might pay themselves special dividends or take 
unfair advantage from business relationship with their companies [Grossman and Hart 
(1988); Harris and Raviv (1988)]. Second, large shareholders may force firms to take 
more risk in hope of higher return. This creates moral hazards problems for debt holders 
as they do not share in upside movements of the firm profit but are affected by the 
downside movements [Jensen and Meckling (1976)].  
The above discussion makes it clear that the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance is inverted U-shaped. Stulz (1988) was the first one to 
suggest this kind of relationship. A number of empirical studies, including McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), Morck, et al. (1988), and Wruck (1989), upheld Stulz’s view. 
A special case of large shareholders is the large-insiders’ ownership which is 
reviewed next. 
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2.3.  Insiders’ Dominance 
Increasing managers’ ownership stake in a firm reduces the agency conflicts 
[Jensen and Meckling (1976)], however, managerial ownership beyond a certain point 
gives rise to another problem, known as managerial entrenchment. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argue that higher managerial ownership makes the managers entrenched from job 
market risks or take-over threats. Entrenched managers are better placed to extract rents 
in the form of special dividends, perks, or bonuses [Shleifer and Vishney (1997)]. 
Managerial entrenchment effects and rent extraction costs are assumed to be greater in 
countries where protection of investors’ and property rights are weak, and judicial 
efficiency is low [La Porta, et al. (2000); Shleifer and Vishney (1997)]. Given that 
Pakistan is a developing country, and like many other developing countries, it is expected 
that investors’ protection is weak and judicial efficiency is low in Pakistan. In addition, 
many firms are owned by families and groups where managers hold significant portion of 
the total shares. In light of the above discussion, we test the following hypothesis, 
H1:  Firms with higher managerial ownership experience poorer performance. 
 
2.4.  The Monitoring Effect of Certain Groups of Shareholders 
Managerial rent extraction can be controlled to some extent if there are 
shareholders in the firm who have monitoring capabilities. Large shareholders, 
institutional shareholders, and associated companies are such groups of shareholders who 
might question and restrict managerial actions. 
 
2.4.1.  Institutional Shareholders and Firm Performance 
Institutional investors are an important stakeholder in corporate governance 
mechanisms because they have the potential to play the monitoring role [Roberts and 
Yuan (2010); Shleifer and Vishny (1986)]. Several reasons exist why they would or 
would not monitor the activities of managers. Institutional investors are usually thought  
to have longer investment horizons which in turn motivate them to get involved in the 
affairs of the firm [Jeon, Lee, and Moffett (2011); Short and Keasey (1999); Wahab 
and Rahman (2009); Shome and Singh (1995)]. Their willingness to monitor is also 
related to their ability to monitor. Their ability in turn is related to several 
factors:Firstly, they have better access to various sources of information to know about 
managerial rent extractions (Lev, 1988); and, secondly, they can potentially intimidate 
the firms’ management either through sale of their shares or by using their voting rights 
[Gillan and Starks (2003)].  
Empirical evidence suggests that when institutional shareholders do not own a 
significant fraction of their total investments in a firm, their level of commitment will be 
low [Burns, Kedia, and Lipson (2010)]. In extreme cases, large external shareholders 
(like institutional shareholders) may be passive voters and may collude with managers to 
expropriate other minority shareholders [Pound (1988)]. A number of studies that 
examined the possibility of whether or not institutional investors can influence a firm 
value have failed to find any association between the two. [Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); 
Duggal and Miller (1999); Faccio and Lasfer (2000); Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walking 
(1996)]. Reasons behind the passive role of institutional investors include lack of ability 
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to monitor [Taylor (1990)], short-term investment horizons [Coffee (1991)] free rider 
problems [Ernst Maug (1998)] and regulatory restrictions [Jennings (2005)]. 
H2: Presence of institutional investors will lead to better performance by the firm. 
 
2.4.2.  Group Association 
If a firm is a part of a large group of companies, the firm can reap several benefits 
from the group association. First, group companies can act as large external shareholders 
who can help in controlling expropriations by the top management. James (1999) adds to 
the view by arguing that the ownership held by the associated firms are more long term in 
nature and this very characteristic of  unmitigated sphere of investment leads to efficient 
strategic decisions. Another argument that goes in favour of associated ownership is that 
a firm can benefit from the goodwill and reputation of the group. Furthermore, group 
companies assist one another through shared resources such as finance, technology, and 
experience [Villalonga and Amit (2006); Wang (2006); Sraer and Thesmar (2007); and 
Maury (2006)].  
Recently, several studies have shifted the focus towards internal conflicts of 
interests that shareholders in business groups can experience [see Dewenter, et al. (2001); 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998); and Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (1998); Berger and 
Ofek (1995)]. On one hand, it is believed that business groups do not act 
opportunistically due to their reputation as these groups are highly visible. This visibility 
might be due to their big sizes and/or usually the famous business tycoons or 
personalities with bureaucratic and political backgrounds that sit on their managerial 
boards [Dewenter, et al. (2001)]. On the other hand, a complex web of intra-group 
transactions might make it more difficult for analysts and investors to know about their 
opportunistic behaviour. Thus the complexity of intra-group transaction can increase the 
probability of opportunistic behaviour.  
In an agency framework, a higher ownership percentage of group companies 
should reduce agency conflict between shareholders and managers, but at the same time, 
it might lead to severe conflicts of interest between majority-insiders and minority-
outsiders. Thus, if the group-reputation hypothesis holds, group companies should exhibit 
better market and accounting performance than non-group companies, as the transaction 
costs of such companies are assumed to be low due to the group size and reputation. 
However, if complexity of transaction hypothesis is true, then group companies would 
display weak performance, which would imply that the group companies are involved in 
minority shareholders exploitation, and/or the group has inferior reputation and is facing 
higher transaction costs. 
In view of the above, two testable hypotheses can be proposed. Given that group 
companies monitor the managers’ activities and/or the firm does not exploit minority 
shareholders due to the group’s reputation, a testable hypothesis is: 
H3a: Higher ownership percentage of associated companies in a firm leads to 
a better performance of the firm. 
If group companies do not care about the group’s image and/or the intra-group 
transactions are considered complex by analysts and shareholders, then they will demand 
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risk premium in view of possible expropriation of minority shareholders. A testable 
hypothesis, in this context, is: 
H3b: Higher ownership percentage of associated companies in a firm leads to 
a better performance of the firm. 
 
2.5.  How to Measure Firm Performance 
An enduring query that has puzzled empirical researchers is what measure of 
performance is most appropriate in studying the relationship between corporate 
ownership structures and a firm’s performance. Literature mainly suggests the use of 
accounting-based and market-based measures of a firm’s performance. Both of them have 
their own advantages and disadvantages. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) used accounting 
profit rate while Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
used both accounting measure and Tobin’s Q as alternative measures of firm 
performance. The majority of researchers like McConnell and Servaes (1990), Loderer 
and Marin (1997), Cho (1998), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) and Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) have used Tobin’s Q as 
a preferred measure of firm performance. These two measures differ in terms of time and 
the fact that who actually measures performance. The problem with accounting profit rate 
is that its calculation is subject to accounting standards which do not account for market 
value of growth options. Also accounting profit rate is inherently more backward-
looking. In other words, accounting profit rate is based on the facts reported in the 
financial records, so future expected cash flows are minimally considered. In contrast, 
Tobin’s Q is a market-based measure of performance. It accounts for all present 
decisions/actions taken by the management as well as the future expected performance of 
the firm. The disadvantage associated with this measure is that it is driven by the 
investors’ psychology and may be biased at time because of the investors’ undue 
optimistic or pessimistic behaviours. Moreover, Tobin’s Q also involves the figures from 
financial records [i.e., book value of tangible assets) in its calculation which is why 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) suggested that there would be a correlation between the 
two measures. The above discussion highlights that each measure has its own pros and 
cons and should be used with caution. This study uses Tobins’s Q as well as accounting-
based measures for the purpose of comparison and robustness of results.  
 
2.6.  Control Variables 
A number of other variables may affect the firm performance beside the ownership 
structures, commonly referred to as the control variables. The following control variables 
have largely been used in empirical studies. 
 
2.6.1.  Financial Leverage 
In perfect capital markets, the capital structure does not influence a firm’s 
value [Modigliani and Miller (1958)]. However, once the assumptions of the perfect 
capital markets are relaxed, then capital structure does matter. Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) looked into this relationship in the context of asymmetric information where 
leverage is treated as a signalling device. They found that information asymmetry 
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between managers and shareholders and between lenders and borrowers could lead to 
adverse selection problem. Ultimately, high quality borrowers can use debt as a 
signalling device and improve its market performance [Leland and Pyle (1977)]. 
Further, leverage is viewed as a mechanism to align the interest of mangers and 
shareholders. Agency theory suggests that there exists a conflict of interest between 
the firm’s managers and shareholders where managers follow their own objectives. 
Higher leverage under such circumstances can play a disciplining role by reducing 
the free cash flow at the managers’ disposal [Jensen (1986)] and may expose the 
managers to external monitoring of lenders [Easterbrook (1984); Rozeff (1982)]. 
Grossman and Hart (1982) further argue that to escape the personal cost of 
bankruptcy, managers will like to have less leverage in the firm’s capital structure. 
Consequently, a better corporate performance is expected in the presence of high 
leverage. An alternative view held by the researchers like Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Myers (1977) targets the agency cost created by different priorities of 
bondholders and stockholders. Shareholders indulge in moral hazards by investing in 
risky projects and enjoy the win-win situation at the cost of bondholders who share in 
losses if the projects fail and do not share in gains if risky project are successful. 
Myers (1977) conjectures that a firm foregoes positive NPV projects in the presence 
of risky-debts, which is known as the underinvestment problem. This set of 
arguments suggests a negative relationship of leverage with firm performance.  
A large strand of literature that provides evidence of both positive and 
negative relationship of leverage and firm performance is a clear signal of 
disagreement among researchers in this area. Mahakud and Misra (2009) attributed 
this disagreement to the definition of corporate performance used by different 
researchers.  
 
2.6.2.  Firm Size 
Size of a firm has a significant role to play in determining performance of the 
firm. Large firms are expected to be more diversified both in terms of demographics 
and product offerings which make them less vulnerable to the risk of bankruptcy 
[Titman and Wessels (1988)]. Fama and French (1992) found significant size 
premium in a sample of more than 5000 US firms from 1927 to 1987. This indicates 
riskiness of small firms. This premium might also relate to low resources 
endowment, poor product quality, lack of research, lower provision for training and 
development of employees, and absence of qualified management in small firms. A 
counter argument is that big firms might suffer from inefficiencies due to tall 
bureaucratic structures. Also, agency problems are expected to be severe in big firms. 
The relative big size of a firm might not necessarily be a result of honest efforts of 
the management. Instead, the managers might have invested in non-value maximising 
projects to ensure continued employment in the firm, get more bonuses, or for 
empire-building [Murphy (1985)]. It will be interesting to see which of these 
competing arguments is corroborated by the empirical findings. In a meta-analysis, 
Capon, Farley and Hoenig (1990) reported that the relationship between firm size and 
financial performance was flat based on the results of 88 empirical studies.  
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2.6.3.  Growth (How Performance Can Affect Growth) 
Capon, et al. (1990, p.1157) commented on growth while discussing the 
implication of their meta-analysis of determinants of financial performance that, 
“High growth situations are desirable; growth is consistently related to profits 
under a wide variety of circumstances.” 
Literature provides several explanations for the positive association between 
growth and firm performance. For example, sales growth has positive impact on factors 
that include internal motivation, promotion and retention of talented employees.  Growth 
facilitates all the way to the implied opportunities for investments in new equipment and 
technologies that upgrade the production process as a whole. In addition, sales growth 
provides opportunities or economies of scale [Gale (1972); Buzzell, et al. (1975)] and 
learning curve benefits. However, sales growth might not always lead to better corporate 
performance. According to agency theory, managers pursue growth because growth helps 
them achieve personal objectives. Growth guarantees employment and salary increases 
for managers due to the greater responsibilities of managing a larger firm [Murphy 
(1985)].  
 
2.6.4.  Beta (Market Risk) 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) 
and Black (1972) and predict a positive relationship between required /observed rate 
of return on a stock and its beta. Beta is the ratio of covariance between a given stock 
return and the market return to the variance of the market return. CAPM assumes that 
beta is a proxy of all systematic risks of a stock. As beta of a stock increases, 
investors will require higher risk premium which will result in lower share price of 
the given stock. As a result, it is expected that beta is negatively related with the 
market performance of a firm.     
 
2.6.5.  Idiosyncratic Risk (Standard Error) 
Theory of CAPM suggests that firm-specific risk is irrelevant because the negative 
covariance between assets’ returns cancel out unsystematic risk of the assets when 
sufficiently large numbers of assets are included in a portfolio. However, when investors 
do not invest in large number of securities, the unsystematic risk of their investments will 
affect them. Majority of the firms are owned and controlled by families, blockholders and 
associated companies in Pakistan. The holdings of these investors are necessarily not 
diversified. Thus, it is expected that unsystematic risk and market performance are 
negatively related in Pakistan. 
 
2.6.6.  Sales Turnover (ST) 
A firm’s financial performance can also depend on how efficiently the 
management uses the firm’s assets. A firm with better utilisation of firm’s resources, like 
a firm with higher sales turnover, is expected to perform well in comparison to other 
firms.  
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2.6.7.  Tangibility (TG) 
Assets tangibility refers to the percentage of a firm’s fixed assets to total assets. 
Assets tangibility can be a proxy for the firm’s operating leverage or availability of 
collaterals which can be offered against debt financing. Operating leverage has 
implications for both risk and returns. In good times, firms with higher operating leverage 
will perform better than other firms and vice versa. In perfect markets, the risk-return 
trade-off will make the share price insensitive to operating leverage. On the other hand, if 
tangibility is considered a proxy for the availability of collaterals, then it is supposed to 
reduce the worries of the lenders which in turn would help in lowering the cost of 
borrowing. Additionally, literature suggests that the collateral can solve several issues 
related to asymmetric information. Chan and Kanatas (1985) argue that the collateral has 
more stable value which gives more confidence to the lender in lending decision. The 
apparent advantage in getting external financing at favourable terms should lead to a 
better firm performance. 
 
3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  Sample and Data Sources 
The study uses the financial and ownership data of 183 firms listed on the Karachi 
Stock Exchange over the period 2003 to 2008. Initially, the sample consisted of all the 
firms with the data available on the pattern of shareholdings. We also require the firms to 
satisfy the following criteria: 
A firm should not be financially-distressed such as firms with negative equities, 
A firm should not be a financial firm, 
A firm should not be owned by the Government of Pakistan, 
Firms with abnormal or influential data can create goodness of fit problems and 
make the generalisation of results difficult. For this reason, all such firms or observations 
were identified with Cook’s D and/or studentised residuals and were removed. 
It is important to note that the data on ownership variables is available but 
sometimes with gaps. This restriction necessitated time series averages of the 
ownership variables for every cross-sectional unit. Theoretically, averages can 
reduce or miss yearly variations in the ownership variables. However, it is expected 
that this problem would not be severe in Pakistan. Since blockholdings are ubiquitous 
and many firms are owned by families and business groups in Pakistan, therefore, 
ownership structures of the listed firms can be expected to show considerable 
persistence over short periods.   
Data on ownership variables is obtained from the annual reports of the sample 
firms. The firms listed on KSE are required by the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and by 
the Code of Corporate Governance, 2002 under clause XIX (i) to provide information on 
the pattern of shareholdings in their annual reports. Financial data has been taken from 
the “Balance Sheet Analysis of Joint Stock Companies Listed on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange”, a publication of the State Bank of Pakistan.  
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3.2.  Specifications of the Models 
A framework of panel data is used to test different hypotheses developed in the 
previous section. Panel data, as noted by Hsiao (1986), has several distinct 
advantages. For example, panel data provides more degrees of freedom, increases 
variations in the data and thereby reduces the chances of multicollinearity, and makes 
it possible to control for fixed effects, etc. We test the hypotheses using the following 
methodology.  
The econometric methodology adopted in this study is broadly borrowed from the 
study conducted by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). They consider firm performance and 
ownership structure as endogenously determined. To account for the endogeniety issue, a 
method of two stages least square (2SLS) is applied. Unlike Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) who use time series averages, this study uses panel data framework because panel 
data analysis has several advantages over simple cross section or time series analysis. 
Due to data limitation, variables such as advertising expenditure, research and 
development expenditures and firm concentration ratio were dropped from the 
econometric model. The final form of the model estimated has the following two 
equations, 
)()()()()()( 654321 iiiitiiit SERBETAGROWTANGINSTDIRCFP 
 
itiiitit YearINDUSTLEVROA   423736987 )()(  … … (1) 
)()()()()()()( 7654321 itiiiitiiti STSERBETAGROWSIZEINSTFPDIRC 
 
itiiititit YearINDUSTROATANGLEV   443938111098 )()()(  … … (2) 
 
3.3.  Testing for Endogenity 
If the problem of endogenity does not exist, then 2SLS regressions yield inefficient 
estimates [Woodridge (2001)]. To test whether ownership variables and firm 
performance are endogenously determined, a test suggest by Durbin–Wu–Hausman 
(1978) can be used which directly compares the OLS and 2SLS estimates and determines 
whether the differences are statistically significant. If estimates from the two regressions 
differ significantly, it can be suspected that ownership variables and firm performance are 
endogenous. Operationally, this can be accomplished by in two steps. In the first step, 
directors’ ownership percentage is regressed on all variables in the Q regression plus 
instrumental variables that are supposed to be correlated with director’s ownership but 
uncorrelated with the error term. Then from this auxiliary regression, residual values are 
predicted. In the second step, the predicted residual values are then added to the Q 
regression as an explanatory variable. If residuals are found to be statistically significant, 
it is taken as an evidence of endogenity. As for the results of this study are concerned, the 
residual values were highly significant and that is why the preferred model for the 
analysis of data is 2SLS regression. 
A summary of the variables used in this study, their measurement and the symbols 
used in the analysis are reported in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Names, Measurement and Symbols of Variables Used in this Study 
Variable Symbol Measurement 
Directors’ ownership  DIRC Shares owned by directors / total shares 
Institutional shareholders’ 
ownership 




ASSO Shares owned by associate companies / total 
shares 




IND Shares owned by individuals/ total shares 
Dividend payout ratio DVD Dividend paid / net income 
Tobin’s Q Q (book value of debt + market value of equity) / 
book value of assets 
Return on Assets ROA Net income / total assets 
Firm Size SIZE Natural log of total assets 
Growth rate GROW Geometric mean of annual percentage increase 
in assets 
Firm’s systematic risk BETA Ratio of covariance between stock returns and 
market returns to the variance of market returns 
Firm’s idiosyncratic risk SER firm-specific error term in the beta regression 
Sales turnover ratio ST Gross sales / total assets 
Financial leverage LEV Total debts / total assets 
Fixed assets ratio TANG Net fixed assets / total assets 
Financial performance FP A general term used for both ROA and Q 
Operational risk CV Coefficient of variation of net income 
 
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this Section, we present and discuss descriptive statistics and results of various 
specifications which were discussed in the Section 3.  
 
4.1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows correlation matrix of the variables used in the regression 
analysis. With the exception of correlation between Q and ROA, none of the other 
variables are correlated to an extent that warrants attention. The two alternative 
measures of performance i.e. Q and ROA have a correlation of 0.53, which shows a 
reasonable level of correlation and hence they can prove to be good alternative 
measures of performance.  
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Table 2 
Matrix of Correlation among the Variables 
  Q DIRC INST GROW LEV TANG ROA SER BETA ST SIZE 
Q 1.00 
          DIRC  –0.21 1.00 
         INST 0.08 –0.36 1.00 
        GROW 0.15 –0.03 0.04 1.00 
       LEV –0.11 0.09 –0.09 0.05 1.00 
      TANG –0.11 0.18 –0.05 –0.15 0.07 1.00 
     ROA 0.53 –0.21 0.14 0.25 –0.33 –0.28 1.00 
    SER –0.31 0.18 –0.24 –0.17 0.09 0.16 –0.35 1.00 
   BETA 0.03 –0.16 0.16 0.07 –0.03 0.12 0.07 –0.23 1.00 
  ST 0.25 –0.15 0.09 0.08 0.02 –0.30 0.36 –0.22 –0.05 1.00 
 SIZE 0.13 –0.29 0.25 0.12 0.17 –0.01 0.16 –0.34 0.26 0.05 1.00 
 
Table 3 reports mean Tobin Q for groups of firms which are based on the 50th 
percentile of the financial and the ownership variables. The results indicate that Tobin’s 
Q is significantly higher in firms where the percentage ownership of associated holdings 
and block holdings is above their respective 50th percentiles. This supports the view that 
associated-holdings and blockholdings reduce agency costs, and/or create positive 
signalling effect. Tobin’s Q is also higher in larger firms and in firms with higher sales 
turnover ratios.  Firm size can be a proxy for financial distress [Titman and Wessel 
(1988)] or information asymmetry [Petit and Singer (1985)]. In either case, the effect of 
firm size is expected to be positive on the market performance. And sales-turnover ratio 
is a gauge of operating efficiency of the firm. The results indicate that better operating 
efficiency leads to higher market performance. On the other hand, Tobin Q is 
significantly lower in firms where directors’ and institutional ownership percentage is 
above their respective 50th percentiles. These results partially support the results in the 
previous section where it was found that directors do not pay dividends willingly. As the 
directors’ percentage of shareholdings increases, they become more powerful in their 
decisions. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, directors’ unwillingness to pay dividends does not 
decline even if a firm faces lower or no transaction costs of external financing. Results in 
Table 3 show that market is recognisant of this fact. With increasing ownership stake of 
directors in a firm, the chances of expropriating other external shareholders increase 
which in turn lead to lower Q. The negative association between Q and institutional 
shareholding is somehow unexpected. Given their monitoring role and signalling effects, 
the association should be positive. One might postulate that institutional shareholders are 
viewed by the market as large entities that collude with managers. However, we need to 
prove this point with stronger evidence that might come from 2SLS regressions. 
Table 3 reports that firm with high systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk have 
lower Qs. In the edifice of capital market theory, only systematic risk is priced into the 
valuation of securities. However, in less-diversified markets, like ones where shares are 
held not according to diversification principles but motivated by control consideration, 
idiosyncratic risk will be a relevant factor.  This  argument seems to be true in Pakistan as  
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Table 3 
Tobin’s Q by 50th Percentile of Firms’ Variables 
Variables Below 50th Percentile Above 50th Percentile Difference T-Value 
DIRC  1.967 1.151 –0.816 –4.959 
INST 1.874 1.287 –0.588 –3.545 
BLOC 1.145 1.986 0.841 5.120 
ASSO 1.153 1.991 0.838 5.101 
GROW 1.774 1.350 –0.424 –2.567 
LEV 1.589 1.545 –0.045 –0.268 
TANG 1.222 1.073 –0.149 –3.846 
ROA 0.915 1.377 0.462 12.985 
SER 1.823 1.315 –0.508 –3.059 
BETA 1.894 1.242 –0.652 –3.916 
ST 1.027 1.268 0.241 6.313 
SIZE 1.076 1.218 0.142 3.655 
 
many firms are controlled by families. Shareholders in these firms are not fully-
diversified. They are affected to a larger extent by firm-specific risks. And finally, Q is 
low in firms that experienced higher growth rate in their assets in previous years. This 
indicates that the market views growth in assets merely as empire building by managers, 
and not as valuable projects that would maximise the shareholders wealth. 
Table 4 is similar in construction and analysis to Table 3, except that this table 
reports mean ROA for groups of firms divided on the basis of median values (50th 
percentile) of selected ownership and financial variables. This analysis is useful in a 
sense that ROA depict a picture of operational performance, whereas Q is the market 
perception of this performance. For example, Table 4 shows that mean ROA is 
significantly lower in firms where directors’ ownership is higher than in firms where 
directors ownership is low. 
This finding corresponds to results reported in Table 3 where Q is significantly lower 
in firms with higher percentage of directors’ ownership. As stated previously, higher 
ownership stake makes the directors powerful enough to influence many decisions in their 
favour. If agency predictions of Jensen and Meckling’s (1986) model are correct, higher 
stakes of directors will give them ample incentives to improve the firm performance and 
increase the firm’s value. But if they know that private benefits are greater than maximising 
the overall value of the firm, they would still act opportunistically and adopt strategies that 
enhance their own welfare. This can be expected in a system which provides room for 
opportunistic behaviours. If this argument is true, managers might try to hide the true profits 
of the firm by colluding with suppliers of raw material and intentionally inflate costs of 
production in books of accounts. Doing so, they directly pocket the cash not paid to suppliers 
but shown in costs of production. Consequently, this will deprive minority shareholders of 
dividends and government of taxes. Though profitable, yet the firm will look less profitable in 
books. Accounting-based measure of firm performance, such as ROA will be lower for firms 
where directors have more control on the firms’ decisions. Since market participants can 
recognise this fact, Tobin’s Q is also expected to be low. The results from both ROA and 
Tobin’s Q mean-comparison analysis in Table 3 and Table 4 are aligned. 
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Table: 4 
ROA by 50th Percentile of Firms’ Variables 
Variables Below 50th Percentile Above 50th Percentile Difference T-Value 
DIRC  0.125 0.070 –0.055* –7.521 
INST 0.091 0.105 0.014 1.857 
BLOC 0.085 0.111 0.027* 3.609 
ASSO 0.071 0.124 0.053* 7.307 
GROW 0.081 0.114 0.033* 4.394 
LEV 0.130 0.066 –0.064* –8.876 
TANG 0.116 0.072 –0.044* –6.030 
Q 0.049 0.140 0.091* 13.48 
SER 0.126 0.071 –0.055* –7.546 
BETA 0.110 0.086 –0.023* –3.117 
ST 0.056 0.133 0.077* 11.070 
SIZE 0.0797 0.109 0.029* 3.975 
 
ROA is higher in firms where institutional ownership is above the 50th percentile 
but the difference in mean ROAs of the two groups of firms is marginally significant at 
10 percent level. In Table 3, institutional shareholding is negatively associated with Q. 
Overall, we do not see a clear picture of how institutional investors influence firm’s 
performance. Table 4 reports that ROA is significantly higher where the percentage 
ownership of blockholders and associated ownership is above their respective 50th 
percentiles. The reason attributed to this positive association can be the possible 
monitoring role.  
Among the financial variables, ROA is higher in larger firms, firms with higher 
growth rate, and firms where ratios of sales-to-tangible assets are higher. It is interesting 
to see that ROA is higher in growing firms, but Tobin Q is lower in such firms. This 
discrepancy is difficult to explain. Explanations for the other variables are the same as 
offered with Q in Table 3. Two of the variables that measure riskiness of a firm’s stock 
price warrant some explanation. Diversified investors do not concern themselves with 
idiosyncratic risk (which is measured by the standard error of the regression on observed 
stock returns and returns of the market index, denoted by SER). However, at firm’s level, 
this risk might matter for a stand-alone firm. If a firm faces higher idiosyncratic risk and 
the firm is not part of a group of firms, even this risk might increase the probability of 
default of the firm. On the other hand, systematic risk (which is measured by coefficient 
of market return in the regression of observed stock returns and returns of the market 
index, and denoted by BETA) affects both diversified and non-diversified firms.  Both 
SER and BETA increases the firm’s risk, and hence it’s cost of capital. The results in 
Table 4 show that ROA is lower in firms with higher SER and BETA. It is inferred that 
firms with higher idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk face higher costs of borrowing 
which results in lower ROA.   
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4.2.  Regression Results of Tobin’s Q and ROA 
The results of regression models are presented in Table 5 and Table 6 where the 
dependent variables are Tobin’s Q and return on asset (ROA), respectively. These tables 
report coefficient of the explanatory variables for both OLS and 2SLS models.  Table In 
fact, Table 7 and Table 8 show results of regressions for robustness checks. The 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are given outside the small parenthesis whereas 
their standard errors are given inside the parentheses. The *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. Since we treat 
managerial ownership as endogenously determined, Table 5 and Table 6 report results of 
both Q regressions and DIRC regression. Under the columns DIRC, we report results of 
regressions where directors’ ownership percentage is the dependent variable.  
 
Table 5 
OLS and 2SLS Regressions for Q 
 
Q 
 OLS 2SLS 
DIRC  –0.369(0.079)* –4.664(1.779)* 
INST –0.165(0.12) –2.033(0.811)** 
GROW 0.489(0.159)* 0.765(0.357)** 
LEV –0.232(0.093)** 0.222(0.272) 
TANG –0.015(0.056) 0.549(0.261)** 
SER –5.795(0.765)* –6.414(1.642)* 
BETA –0.055(0.03)*** –0.204(0.088)** 
SIZE 0.008(0.014) –0.151(0.072)** 
Constant 1.545(0.129)* 3.566(0.877)* 
F-Statistics 17.22 4.08 
P-value(F-Statistics) 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.14 0.13 
Adj.R2 0.1323 0.1298 
 
Table 6 
OLS and 2SLS Regressions for ROA 
 
ROA 
 OLS 2SLS 
DIRC  –0.008(0.013) 0.163(0.153) 
INST 0.022(0.019) 0.083(0.058) 
ST 0.058(0.004)* 0.062(0.005)* 
GROW 0.13(0.027)* 0.082(0.049)*** 
LEV –0.161(0.015)* –0.16(0.016)* 
SIZE 0.019(0.002)* 0.026(0.007)* 
Intercept –0.062(0.022)* –0.19(0.12) 






 0.53 0.441 
Adj.R
2
 0.51 0.4203 
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In all Q regressions, results are consistent as far as the coefficient of the DIRC is 
concerned, except in Table 7 where ownership percentage of associated holdings is used 
as a proxy of external monitoring. The results of both OLS and 2SLS estimations show 
that Tobin’s Q is inversely related with the ownership percentage of directors. These 
results are in line with the argument of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who proposed that 
large shareholders may distribute wealth in a manner that adversely affects the interest of 
minority shareholders (known as the expropriation hypothesis). When the directors’ 
ownership percentage increases, they gain more and more control over the decisions of 
the firm which makes the expropriation of minority shareholders more likely. 
Expropriation exacerbates agency costs and negatively affects firm value. The literature 
provides one more explanation for the results. Fama and Jensen (1983) discussed in their 
seminal paper the costs of insiders’ holdings. They argued that higher ownership 
percentage but induce other costs make managers entrenched (formally known as the 
entrenchment hypothesis). The likelihood of firing or challenging the decisions of 
directors who have larger chunk of shareholdings in their hands is theoretically small. 
Consequently, higher ownership stake of the manager in the firm may not necessarily 
align their interest with that of the other shareholders. The negative sign of DIRC 
coefficient approves the entrenchment and expropriation hypotheses against the 
alignment of interest hypothesis. As argued in previous sections, legal protection and 
investors’ activism are weak in Pakistan. Insiders try to exploit outsider minority 
shareholders and avoid taxes as and when the opportunity arises. One indication of this 
was reported in the case of dividends in the earlier analysis. The dividend payout ratios 
were found to be significantly lower in firms with higher directors’ ownership 
percentage. This was true whether or not the firm faced transaction costs of external 
financing. Weak legal protection of the investors’ rights like in case of Pakistan 
aggravates the costs of entrenchment. Recognisant of this fact, the market values firms 
less favourably where directors owns a substantial fraction of the firm shares. 
In ROA regression, the sign of the coefficient of the DIRC is still negative; 
however, it is statistically insignificant in all regressions. The results indicate that 
increasing ownership stake of directors in a firm does not improve the operating 
performance of the firm which negates the prediction of alignment of interest hypothesis, 
proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). When one considers this finding in 
combination with Q results, it can be argued that managerial ownership is not a source of 
value creation to the firm; instead it is a source of value destruction.  
The three proxies used for external monitoring effect yield conflicting results. In 
Table 7, the linkage between INST and Q is negative both in OLS and 2SLS, though the 
coefficient is statistically significant only in the later. BLOC and ASSO are positively 
and significantly affect Q only in OLS regression. These findings are against what one 
might expect.  
Intuitional shareholders, blockholders, and associated companies have potentially 
more incentives and capabilities to monitor and actively participate in running of the 
firm. Two explanations can be given for the negative coefficient of the INST. First, it is 
possible that institutional investors collude with managers and collectively expropriate 
minority shareholders. Second, it is expected that institutional shareholders sell their 
shares when market values of the firm’s shares are high, possibly because they speculate 
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that better performance will be followed by worst performance. This explanation will 
hold true especially in highly volatile markets. Like many emerging markets, Pakistani 
stock market is also characterised by higher volatility. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
provide similar justification when they found that director’s ownership declined 
significantly when Tobins’ Q was high.  
Table 7 shows that market performance of the firms included in the sample 
increases with the increase in ownership percentage of associated companies and 
blockholders. However, these results are statistically significant only in the OLS 
regressions. ROA regressions display similar statistics. Results in Table 8 show that 
ownership percentages of associated companies or the blockholders in a firm have 
significant impact on the operating performance of the firm. These findings are 
incongruent with the view that significant ownership by blockholders in a firm or the 
association of a firm with a group of companies have positive externalities in the form of 
reduced agency costs or benefiting from the experiences and resources-sharing of the 
group companies. It is important to note that previous research studies use the term 
‘blockholders’ for external large shareholders who are not part of the executive 
management. However, the data do not allow us to differentiate between internal and 
external blockholders. In Pakistan, as argued before, family holdings is a prominent 
feature of the corporate sector. Therefore, in the absence of complete information, the 
compelling assumption is that blockholders are either directors or family members of the 
top management. Based on this assumption, BLOC should reduce problems between 
management and shareholders. But it might give birth to another agency problem that 
exists between the majority and the minority shareholders [Shleifer and Vishny (1997)]. 
This way, higher ownership percentage of blockholders presents a trade-off between the 
benefits of reduced agency costs against the costs of minority expropriation. If these two 
are equal in amount, the ownership percentage of blockholders should be inconsequential 
to the value of the firm.  
 
Table 7 
OLS and 2SLS Regressions for Q 
 
Blockholders Associated Companies 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
DIRC  –0.285(0.075)* –4.048(1.548)* –0.046(0.095) 11.219(11.034) 
BLOC/ASSO 0.427(0.079)* –0.084(0.262) 0.426(0.085)* 6.674(6.126) 
GROW 0.453(0.157)* 0.751(0.336)** 0.518(0.157)* 0.459(0.664) 
LEV –0.224(0.091)** 0.306(0.283) –0.167(0.092)*** –0.361(0.432) 
TANG –0.033(0.055) 0.495(0.242)** –0.008(0.055) –0.837(0.844) 
SER –5.937(0.748)* –4.726(1.571)* –5.661(0.748)* –7.364(3.561)** 
BETA –0.034(0.03) –0.222(0.097)** –0.03(0.03) 0.663(0.691) 
SIZE 0.003(0.013) –0.165(0.073)** –0.007(0.014) 0.123(0.14) 
Constant 1.299(0.13)* 3.074(0.771)* 1.357(0.128)* –3.745(5.024) 
F-Statistics 21.16 5.73 20.56 1.29 
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Table 8 
OLS and 2SLS Regressions for ROA  
 
Blockholders Associated Companies 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
DIRC  –0.011(0.012) 0.127(0.132) –0.028(0.015)*** 0.055(0.087) 
ST 0.057(0.004)* 0.059(0.005)* 0.059(0.004)* 0.057(0.005)* 
GROW 0.13(0.027)* 0.091(0.045)** 0.125(0.027)* 0.116(0.028)* 
LEV –0.163(0.015)* –0.166(0.016)* –0.165(0.015)* –0.163(0.015)* 
SIZE 0.019(0.002)* 0.026(0.007)* 0.02(0.002)* 0.022(0.003)* 
BLOC 0.004(0.013) 0.009(0.014) –0.028(0.014)** 0.015(0.048) 
Intercept –0.06(0.023)* 0.16(.102) –.04(.02)* –.04(.06)*** 
F-Statistics 31.2 27.1 31.01 30.01 
P-value(F-Statistics) 0.00 .00 .00 .00 
R2 0.53 0.46 0.53 0.52 
Adj.R2 0.51 0.44 0.51 0.5 
 
Similarly, the ownership percentage of associated companies presents a trade-off. 
As discussed previously, association of a firm with a group of firms can help the firm in 
financial matters, technology transfers, experience sharing, and in overcoming many 
imperfections in product, capital, and labour markets [for a survey of this literature, 
Tarziján (1999) can be seen]. Moreover, it is believed that business groups do not act 
opportunistically due to their reputation as these groups are highly visible [Dewenter, et 
al. (2001)]. Thus, group association should have a positive impact on the firm’s operating 
and market performance. On the other hand, a complex web of inter-group transactions 
might make it difficult for analysts and investors to know about opportunistic behaviour, 
thus the complexity of their intra-group transactions increases the probability of their 
opportunistic transactions. Again, if the benefits of group association and costs of 
opportunistic behaviour of group firms are equal in amount, the ownership percentage of 
associated companies in a firm should be inconsequential to the value of the firm. 
Unfortunately, it cannot be said in the current analysis whether the irrelevance of 
ownership by blockholders and associated companies in firm performance is due to these 
trade-offs or due to passive roles of these shareholders.  
Among the control variables, idiosyncratic risk and market risk are still negatively 
related to market performance of the firm as they were in the mean-comparison tests in 
Table 3. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Lintner (1965), Black (1972) and 
Sharpe (1964) predict a positive relationship between required /observed rate of return on 
a stock and beta (a measure of systematic risk) of the stock. CAPM argues that firm-
specific risk (firm-specific error term in the beta regression) is cancelled out when 
sufficiently large number of assets are included in a portfolio which is why idiosyncratic 
risk is irrelevant. The coefficient of systematic risk, BETA, is negative in the regression 
used for an analysis. As mentioned above, CAPM predicts that higher beta leads to a 
higher expected return, which is possible only when the firm’s stock price is low. In other 
words, beta and stock price should be negatively related. Thus, as far as the firm’s 
systematic risk is concerned, the results support CAPM but are not in line with the 
findings of Fama and French (1992) who found that the relationship between beta and 
returns is flat. The reason one may give in support of negative and statistically significant 
linkage between idiosyncratic risk, SER, and Tobin’s Q is that investors in Pakistan do 
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not hold diversified portfolios. Majority of the firms are owned and controlled by 
families, blockholders and associated companies. The holdings of these investors are 
necessarily not diversified. In the parlance of capital market theory, idiosyncratic risk will 
be irrelevant only if investors hold diversified portfolios. Negative coefficient of SER 
proves the above assertion.    
Firm size, which is used as a control variable in the Q and ROA regressions, has 
negative impact on market performance and positive impact on operating performance of 
the firm. Larger size helps a firm to have more economies of scale, face lower 
information asymmetry [Petit and Singer (1985)] and face lower chances of bankruptcy 
[Titman and Wessels (1988)]. Both the market and operating performance of the firm 
should be positively related to the size of the firm. One explanation for the results might 
be that opportunistic managers may increase size of a firm irrespective of whether such 
an increase maximises the shareholders’ wealth or not which is why larger firms are 
viewed unfavourably by the market. However, the discrepancy in the results of ROA and 
Q regression is not explainable. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The main objective of this paper was to highlight the importance of the ownership 
structure and its impact on the financial and the market based performance of the firm. 
These objectives are accomplished by empirically evaluating the data of 183 non-
financial firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange for the period 2003 to 2008. The 
impact of the ownership structure on firm performance is investigated in detail. The 
results indicate that Tobin’s Q is significantly higher in firms where the percentage 
ownership of associated holdings and block holdings is above their respective 50th 
percentiles. This supports the view that associated-holdings and blockholdings reduce 
agency costs, and/or create positive signalling effect. Tobin’s Q is also higher in larger 
firms and in firms with higher sales turnover ratios. 
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